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BEFORE THE COURT AS THE ELEMENTS OF EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL HAVE NOT BEEN SATISFIED. 
POINT THREE 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S REQUEST K> MODIFY THE 
DECREE WAS TIMELY. 
POINT FOUR 
ALIMONY AND MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE 
NOT IDENTICAL BUT ARE FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES AND 
SHOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY. 
POINT FIVE 
THE PARTIES' INTENTION IN THElk STIPULATION 
MUST BE CONSTRUED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE UNDER THE THEN 
EXISTING LAWS, NAMELY BENNETT AND WENT ONLY TO THE 
ISSUE OF ALIMONY. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JON E. HOLDERMAN, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ] 
vs. ] 
SHIRLEY ANN HOLDERMAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. ] 
Case No. 860207-CA 
) 13-B 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action based upon domestic law and equity. This 
appeal is taken from portions of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order on Order to Show cause in which Defendant-Appellant 
made a request for a portion of Plaintiff-Respondent's military 
retirement benefits based upon the Uniformed Services Former 
Spouses Protection Act (10 U.S.C.C. Sec, 1408 et.al). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court in the Order on Order to Show Cause signed 
and entered on the 25th of April, 1986, denied Defendant-
Appellant's request for an allocation of Plaintiff-Respondent's 
military retirement benefits based upon the theory that "retirement 
and alimony awards have exactly the same purpose except that 
alimony is for the present and retirement is for later when the 
spouse is no longer working. The Court believes that the par t ies 
intended full well that $8,500.00 would take care of all future claims 
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under the circumstances". FF, CL p2 par.2. 
The Notice of Appeal was timely filed with the District Court on 
or about the 21st day of May, 1986. The Court ruled that the parties 
had entered into a stipulation and agreement which resolved all the 
divorce issues including spousal retirement benefits by reason that 
Defendant-Appellant had waived her right to alimony. Defendant-
Appellant believes the Court erred in not fully considering two 
aspects of this case. The first being that at the time the parties 
entered into their property settlement the Uniform Services Former 
Spouses Protection Act had not been enacted by Congress and made 
retroactive to include divorces granted within the time frame of this 
divorce. Secondly, that the parties could not "mutually agree" or 
come to a meeting of the minds regarding Plaintiff-Respondent's 
military retirement division when the law in Utah at the time the 
parties entered into the stipulation wherein Defendant-Appellant 
agreed to waive alimony was that District Court would not consider a 
person's military retirement as part of the marital assets of a 
marriage. 
Defendant-Appellant believes the lower court erred and didn't 
understand the Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act 
which was enacted in 1982 and made retroactive and applicable to 
divorces granted subsequent to June 26, 1981. Defendant-Appellant 
was notified that Plaintiff-Respondent was to retire and was further 
notified that she was entitled to benefits upon which she 
immediately filed the action with the District Court to obtain said 
benefits and requested the court to modify the Decree pursuant to 
the federal act division of Plaintiff-Respondent's retirement benefits. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
That the decision of the District Court be overruled and that 
Defendant-Appellant be awarded her portion of Plaintiff-
Respondent's military benefits which she is entitled to pursuant to 
the federal act and the Woodward v. Woodward (cite) formula which 
this Court has already pronounced together with her costs and 
attorney's fees in this matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The parties hereto were granted a Decree of Divorce, which 
divorce was heard on the 1st day of December, 1981 and signed and 
entered on or about the 11th of December, 1981. The divorce was 
granted pursuant to a stipulation and agreement by and between the 
parties which was dated October, 1981. 
At the time the parties entered into the stipulation and 
agreement, the military retirement issue was governed and 
controlled by the decision in McCartv vs. McCartv. 453 US 210, 101 
S.Ct, 2728 which was decided on June 26, 1981. In essence, it ruled 
that unless the military retirement had been vested at the time of 
the divorce, i.e. that the military retirement was being received by 
the retiree, that the military retirement was not marital property 
and therefore could not be considered by a Court for a division of 
marital assets in a divorce. The law in the State of Utah at the time 
the divorce was granted on December 11, 1981 and when the parties 
negotiated their divorce settlement was governed by the decision as 
set forth in the case of Bennett v. Bennett 607 P.2d 839, 840 (Utah, 
1980), which held that it was error for a court to consider a 
retirement fund contributed by the U.S. Government as one of the 
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assets of the parties. 
When the parties negotiated their divorce settlement, Plaintiff-
Respondent had not retired, even though he had over twenty years 
in military service. Since the law which governed retirement did not 
deem it to be a marital asset, subject to the division by the Court, the 
parties and their counsel did not even consider it as a marital asset 
of the divorce nor could they consider it. The military retirement 
therefore, was not even considered by the parties in their property 
settlement negotiations and subsequent stipulation and agreement. 
Therefore, the property settlement is silent as is the Decree of 
Divorce regarding Plaintiff-Respondent's military retirement. 
The U.S. Congress passed the Uniformed Services Former 
Spouses Protection Act on September 8, 1982, Public Law 97-252, 
10 USC 1401 et.al. which revised the McCarty decision and granted to 
spouses of former spouses certain rights to their spouses' military 
retirement if they qualified by being married at lease 10 years to the 
military spouse before the divorce was granted. The law as applied 
to the States allowed the State's courts to consider a non-vested 
military retirement as an asset of a marriage and award the non-
military spouse up to one-half of the military retirement based upon 
the length of the marriage vs. the length of the retirement. 
The Act also made the law applicable retroactive to all divorces 
which had been granted after June 26, 1981 and allowed that State 
courts could modify Divorce Decrees which had been entered after 
June 26, 1981 but before the Act was passed on September 8, 1982, 
requiring the Court to modify those decrees and determine the 
allocation of the military benefits "in accordance with the law of the 
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jurisdiction of such court" 10 USC 1431. 
The lower court failed to properly apply the Act and found 
military retirement and alimony to "have exactly the same pu*pose 
except that alimony is for the present and retirement is for later" FF, 
CL p2 Par.2; treated alimony and military retirement as being the 
same thing; determined that Defendant-Appellant had waived 
alimony and concluded that she therefore had waived her right to 
Plaintiff-Respondent's military retirement. 
That Defendant-Appellant appealed the District Court's ruling 
to this court and seeks reversal and determination and an allocation 
of Plaintiff-Respondent's military retirement pursuant to the Act and 
costs and attorney's fees in this matter. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court failed to correctly apply the Uniform Services 
Former Spouses Protection Act (10 U.S.C.C. Sec. 1408) retroactively 
pursuant to said Act and allow a division of a military retirement as 
set forth in Woodward v. Woodward . 656 P.2d 431. The court held 
alimony and a division of military retirement to the same thing and 
denied Defendant-Appellant relief based upon a stipulation waiving 
alimony, which under the then existing law, it would have been error 
for the parties to have divided military retirement which had not 
vested. 
Defendant-Appellant is entitled to have the courts consider a 
division of military retirement pursuant to W o o d w a r d . The Act 
requires the courts to allow modification of an entered divorce if said 
decree was entered between June 25, 1981 and September, 1982. 
Therefore, Defendant-Appellant is entitled to have the court divide 
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Plaintiff-Respondent's military retirement income and not be denied 




DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO A PORTION OF THE 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS RETIREMENT AS PER PUBLIC LAW 97-
252, UNIFORMED SERVICES FORMER SPOUSES PROTECTION ACT (10 
U.S.C.S. SEC. 1408). 
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 
enacted by Congress in 1982, overruled, for the most part, the effect 
of McCartv v. McCartv. 453 US 210, 69 L Ed. 2d 589, 101 Set 2728. 
In the McCartv case, the United States Supreme Court held that upon 
dissolution of a military officers marriage, a state court was 
precluded by federal law from dividing military nondisability retired 
pay pursuant to state property laws. Federal statute 10 USCS Sec. 
2771, indicates that Congress intended retired pay to be a personal 
entitlement. 
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act in 
overruling McCar tv provides that a state court can divide military 
retirement benefits as a part of a distribution of marital property 
incident to a divorce proceeding. The marriage must have been in 
existence for a minimum of ten years and the spouse's portion cannot 
exceed fifty percent. The purpose of the Act is to return jurisdiction 
of the issue to the states. Since the Decree of Divorce in the case at 
bar was granted after June 26, 1981, the Act allows the Defendant-
Appellant to return to Court and have her case considered as one of 
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first impression. 
There is considerable authority in other states for the 
contention that retirement benefits, whether military or otherwise, 
vested or non-vested are considered a marital assets, subject to 
division. This holds true whether the request to have the retirement 
benefits divided comes at the time of dissolution or at a later date. 
In Smith v. Smith. 699 P2.d 448 (Wash 1983), the former wife 
filed a petition for modification of a dissolution decree asking to be 
awarded a percentage of the former husband's military retired 
pension payments. Former husband responded asking that the Court 
set aside his deed of the family home to the wife. The military 
pension had not been awarded to either spouse in the original decree 
or in the final documents granting the dissolution. Mr. Smith 
testified that although there was no agreement between him and his 
wife at the time he deeded the house to her, he took this action to 
"cause her to stop any action toward trying to secure one-half of my 
retirement pay." The trial court concluded, and the Supreme Court 
upheld that there was no agreement or waiver by the wife of her 
rights in the military pension inexchange for the deed. 
In Gordon v. Gordon. 659 SW2d 475, (Tex. App. 13 Dist 1983), 
the Court held the failure of the trial court to consider the husband's 
military retired benefits in apportioning community estate was error 
in light of subsequent enactment of the Uniformed Services Former 
Spouses Protection Act, even though the trial court was not at fault 
since the law at the time of the divorce decree effectively precluded 
the trial court from considering such benefits. 
On motion of the wife to reopen an eighteen month old 
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judgment to permit additional evidence and argument, the Family 
Court in Smith v. Smith, 458 A.2d 711, (Del. Fam. Ct. 1983) held that 
the wife's motion in view of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses 
Protection Act, to reopen would be granted, since the decision to 
reopen was a decision to permit the wife to present her case under 
Delaware law as it existed before McCartv and to do otherwise would 
be to carve out a category of people whose cases were decided 
between June 25, 1981 and September 9, 1982 and deprive them of 
substantial property interest which other similarly situated litigants 
have been awarded. 
Where trial court still had control of its divorce 
judgment, awarding husband all military retirement 
benefits, when United States Supreme Court's McCartv 
decision was overturned by Uniformed S e r v i c e s 
Former Spouses Protection Act, community estate had 
divisible interest in husband's military nondisability 
retirement benefits. Veronin v. Veronin. 662 SW.2d 
102 (Tex. App. 3 Dist. 1983) 
In Walentowski v. WalentowskL 672 P.2d 657 (NM 1983), the 
wife appealed from a dissolution decree challenging the division of 
marital property. The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection act, which allows each 
state to determine if military retirement benefits are to be 
considered marital property, applied retroactively to the date of 
McCartv and hence, although the Act was in effect after the date of 
the final divorce, the wife was entitled to the Act's benefits. 
Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Ut 1982) held that the 
concept of "vesting" of retirement or pension is an inappropriate 
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basis for determining what property should be subject to equitable 
division in divorce proceedings. 
The Supreme Court of Utah upheld the trial Court's award of a 
portion of the husband's retirement benefits that accrued during 
mariage, notwithstanding the husband was not entitled to such 
benefits until he worked fifteen additional years. 
W o o d w a r d overruled Bennett v. Bennett. 607 P.2d 839 (Ut 
1980) in which the Supreme Court reversed a trial court's division of 
the husband's retirement benefits because the government's future 
contribution to retirement funds was found to have no present value. 
To the extent that Bennett v. Bennett, supre, may limit 
the ability of the Court to consider all of the parties' 
assets and circumstances, including retirement and 
pension rights, it is expressly overruled. W o o d w a r d . 
Op.cit. 
It was the intention of Congress that spouses aggrieved as a 
result of McCarty should have a chance to rectify the situation when 
the report stated at Page 5: 
Former spouses divorced in the interum period 
between the McCarty decision and the effective date of 
this law will have the opportunity to return to Court to 
have their decrees modified in light of this legislation. 
Based upon the interest of Congress and the upholdings of 
other states in similar factual situation, the Court erred in denying 
Defendant-Appellant a hearing to allocate her entitlement to 
Plaintiff-Respondent's military benefits under the U n i f o r m e d 
Services Former Spouses Protection Act, which law was mandated by 
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Congress and made applicable to the state courts. 
POINT TWO 
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED 
TO PREVENT BRINGING FORTH THE ISSUE OF THE PLAINTIFF-
RESPONDENTS MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS BEFORE THE COURT 
AS THE ELEMENTS OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL HAVE NOT BEEN 
SATISFIED. 
Broadly speaking the essential elements of estoppel 
are: (1) Conduct which amounts to a false 
representation or concealment of material facts or at 
least which is calculated to convey the impression that 
the facts are otherwise then and inconsistent with, 
those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; 
(2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that such 
conduct shall be acted upon or influence, the other 
party or other persons; and (3) knowledge actual or 
constructive, of the real facts. 28 AM JUR 2d Sec. 35, 
Estoppel and Waiver pp. 640-641. 
Further elements as relating to the party claiming the estoppel 
are: (1) lack of knowledge and the means of knowledge of the truth 
as to the facts in question; (2) reliance in good faith upon the conduct 
or statements of the party to be estopped; and (3) action or inaction 
based thereon of such a character as to change the position or status 
of the party claiming the estoppel to his injury, detriment or 
prejudice. 28 AM JUR 2d Sec 35, Estoppel and Waiver pp. 640-641. 
The above elements have not been satisfied as the omission of 
the military retirement pension was not due to fraud, false 
representation or concealment. The law under M c C a r t y . the 
controlling case at the time of dissolution, precluded consideration of 
the benefits as marital property. Further, the Plaintiff-Respondent 
has not shown a change in status to his detriment. 
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In Henn v. Henn. 605 P.2d 10 (Cal 1980), the wife's failure to 
assert her community property rights to the husband's military 
retirement pension during divorce proceedings did not collaterally 
estop her from asserting her right to the pension in a later action. A 
finding by the trial court in de Carteret v. de Carteret. 615 P.2d 513 
(Wash App 1980) that the omission of retirement funds of the 
husband and wife from the dissolution decree was inadvertent could 
not support the conclusion that the husband received the funds by 
implication, in that the decree of dissolution did not purport to 
dispose of the parties' retirement benefits, either expressly or by 
reference. 
The Court held that the wife should not be denied contenancy 
rights of the military retirement benefits which had inadvertently 
been omitted from the dissolution decree under the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel where there was no act or statement indicating 
any inconsistency or impropriety in the wife's representations, and 
the record reflected that failure to consider the retirement was 
entirely an innocent oversight shared by the husband. 
POINT THREE 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S REQUEST TO MODIFY THE DECREE 
WAS TIMELY. 
Defendant-Appellant was timely in her return to court to 
request an award of Plaintiff-Respondent's military retirement. 
Defendant-Appellant had just been notified in July, 1985 that 
Plaintiff-Respondent was to retire. She was sent forms from the 
military to complete and requested to furnish a copy of the Decree of 
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Divorce awarding her portion of Plaintiff-Respondent's retirement. 
She was further advised that she was eligible for a portion of the 
retirement and that she Sxiould return to court, modify the Decree to 
include an allocation and submit a certified copy to the military 
retirement board. 
Defendant-Appellant filed her motion to modify the Decree 
within two months of Plaintiff-Respondent's retirement date. Until 
Plaintiff-Respondent retired, it would have been impossible to 
calculate her benefits since it is based upon the length of his service 
versus the number of years she was married to him. 
There is no statute of limitations regarding modifying the 
Divorce Decree pursuant to the Act. Our statutes provide for just 
such an occasion Section 30-3-5(3) U.C.A. 1953 (as amended) 
provides that the Court has the "continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for ... the distribution of property 
as is reasonable and necessary." 
There is considerable case law dealing with property not 
disposed of in the judgment or decree of divorce in which parties are 
properly afforded the opportunity to return to the court for 
disposition. 
Where issue of husband's military pension was not 
before the Court which issued final decree of marriage 
dissolution, wife's putative interest in such asset was 
not extinguished by decree and wife could later bring 
action claiming that she had community property 
interest in pension to extent it was earned during 
marriage. Henn, Op.cit. 
Because a spouse's entitlement to a share of 
community property arises at the time that the 
- 1 3 -
property is acquired, and that interest is not altered 
except by judicial decree or an agreement between the 
parties, property which is not mentioned in the 
pleadings in a dissolution proceeding as community 
property is left unadjudicated by the decree, and is 
subject to future litigation, the parties being tenants in 
common meanwhile. 24 AM JUR 2d Sec. 958, Divorce 
and Separation, p. 945; See also Barros , Op.cit.; d e 
Carteret. Op.cit.; Gordon. Op.cit. 
POINT FOUR 
ALIMONY AND MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE NOT 
IDENTICAL BUT ARE FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES AND SHOULD BE 
TREATED DIFFERENTLY. 
The lower Court found that "alimony and retirement awards 
have exactly the same purpose, except that alimony is for the 
present and retirement is for later when the spouse is no longer 
working." FF, CL p2 par.2. In so finding, the Court erred. Alimony 
is for spousal support and is based upon need, current financial 
incomes of the parties, differences in earning potential, etc. A 
military retirement or any retirement is a marital asset of the 
marriage, like a savings account and would and should be considered 
in a property division. The Court in this case treated alimony and 
military retirement as being the same thing. Defendant-Appellant 
respectfully disagrees with the Court and urges this Court to so find. 
POINT FIVE 
THE PARTIES1 INTENTION IN THEIR STIPULATION MUST BE 
CONSTRUED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE UNDER THE THEN EXISTING 
LAWS, NAMELY BENNETT AND WENT ONLY TO THE ISSUE OF 
ALIMONY. 
Paragraph 8 of the Amended Decree of Divorce reads at page 2: 
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8. The Defendant shall take $8,500.00 in savings as and 
for full and final property settlement and thereby waives 
any present and future right to alimony. 
The lower Court construed said paragraph to understand that 
Defendant-Appellant had somehow agreed to bargain her right to 
Plaintiff-Respondent's military retirement away. The lower court 
found that the parties intended full well that $8,500.00 would take 
care of all future claims under the circumstances. FF. CL. p2 par.2. 
I submit that the parties' only intention was that Plaintiff-
Respondent's one-half of the marital savings was to be paid to 
Defendant-Appellant for a lump sum alimony settlement. How could 
the parties hereto reach a meeting of the minds regarding future 
military retirement benefits when the parties, their lawyers, and the 
courts were working under Bennet t and the Uniformed Services 
Former Spouses Protection Act hadn't been passed allowing a 
division of the same. Clearly the Court erred in finding that the 
parties intended that $4,250.00, Plaintiff-Respondent's one-half of 
savings was for alimony and future military benefits, which no court 
could divide, consider or grant. However, the lower court so found 
and denied Defendant-Appellant's request for division since the 
lower court considers alimony and military retirement benefits are 
one and the same. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the lower court's decision in this 
matter and award Defendant-Appellant one-half of 22/25 of 
Plaintiff-Respondent's military benefits pursuant to Woodward and 
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the Act. That Defendant-Appellant should be awarded costs incurred 
herein together with her attorney's fees. 
DATED this day of , 1987. 
SCOTT W. HOLT, Attorney for 
Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, SCOTT W. HOLT, hereby certify that I have mailed four (4) 
true and accurate copies of the aforegoing Brief of Defendant-
Appellant to the attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, BETTIE J. MARSH, 
Legal Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401 this 
day of June, 1987. 
Scott W. Holt 
ADDENDUM 
BETTIE J. MARSH, #2088 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 844 01 
Telephone: 6 21-2464 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JON E. HOLDERMAN, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-vs- ) 
SHIRLEY ANN HOLDERMAN, ) CIVIL NO: 1-30831 
Defendant. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on the 8th day of April, 1986, at 3:30 p.m., before the 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District Judge, sitting 
without a jury. Neither party was personally present but 
was represented by their respective counsel, Bettie J. Marsh 
for Plaintiff and Scott W. Holt for Defendant, and counsel 
having proffered testimony in support of the allegations and 
their respective Affidavits on the Order To Show Cause, and 
having submitted Memorandums of Points and Authorities, and 
the Court being fully advised in the premises, makes and 
enters the following: 
J. MARSH 
KY AT I-AW 
•EL AVK.NIR 
I T AII »M-M>1 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the provision contained in Paragraph 8 of the 
Decree of Divorce whereby Defendant received $8,500.00 "as 
and for full and final property settlement" concluded the 
retirement issue. 
2. That retirement and alimony awards have exactly 
the same purpose except that alimony is for the present and 
retirement is for later when the spouse is no longer work-
ing. The Court believes that the parties intended full well 
that $8,500.00 would take care of all future claims under 
the circumstances. 
3. The parties have overlooked re-tirement rights 
which Defendant may have in Plaintiff's retirement benefits 
after his death. But Defendant is entitled to claim any 
"benefits" which may be available to her by Federal law as 
the surviving former spouse of a serviceman. 
4. That the Divorce Decree clearly intended in 
Paragraph 9 for Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant for her 
travel expenses from Salt Lake City to Florida, and the 
parties have admitted through counsel that this amount was 
$633.00. 
5. That the time has long passed for Defendant to 
make any claims against Plaintiff for furniture and other 
items of personal property which she requests in her Affida-
vit for Order To Show Cause. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 2 
6. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That Defendant is denied any claim, past, present 
or future, for an award of any part of Plaintiff's current 
retirement benefits. 
2. That Defendant is awarded the right to any bene-
fits she may have by Federal law as the surviving former 
spouse of Plaintiff, a retired serviceman. Said benefits 
are those accruing upon his death. 
3. Defendant is awarded a judgment against the 
Plaintiff in the sum of $633.00 as and for her travel 
expenses pursuant to the award in the Decree of Divorce. 
4. Defendant is denied any claim to personal property 
in the way of furniture or furnishings from Plaintiff. 
5. Each party shall bear his own attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in this action. 
DATED this day of April, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
: J MAKSH 
WEX A\ F M K 
I T A H *4*Ol 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 3 
N O T I C E 
TO: SCOTT W. HOLT, ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT: 
BETTIK J M \HHU 
ATTtlHNKY AT l - A * 
**4T KIKMKI AS K M K 
<X;DK.N I T A H *•**»! 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, 
attorney for Plaintiff, will submit the above and foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the Judge of the 
above-entitled Court for his signature, upon the expiration 
of five (5) days from the date this Notice is mailed to you, 
and after allowing three (3) days for mailing, unless 
written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to 
Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts of 
the State of Utah. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this / ^ ^ d a y of April, 1986. 
[TIE JC/MARSH 
Attorney/ for Plaintiff 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
>ftkA I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /y^day of April, 1986, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by placing same in 
the U.S. Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the follow-
ing: 
Scott W. Holt 
Attorney for Defendant 
44 North Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 
J MAKSI! 
W AT l . \ W 
* L AN K M K 
T A H H444II 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
BETTIE J. MARSH, #2088 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 6 21-24 64 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JON E. HOLDERMAN, ) 
) ORDER ON ORDER 
Plaintiff, ) TO SHOW CAUSE 
-vs- ) 
SHIRLEY ANN HOLDERMAN, ) CIVIL NO: 1-30831 
Defendant. ) 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on the 8th day of April, 1986, at 3:30 p.m., before the 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District Judge, sitting 
without a jury. Neither party was personally present but 
was represented by their respective counsel, Bettie J. Marsh 
for Plaintiff and Scott W. Holt for Defendant, and counsel 
having proffered testimony in support of the allegations and 
their respective Affidavits on the Order To Show Cause, and 
having submitted Memorandums of Points and Authorities, and 
the Court being fully advised in the premises, and having 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, sepa-
rately in writing, now states: 
BKTTIK J. MAHSH 
ATTOKMCY AT U H 1 
¥+47 KI KM EL AN K M K 
tHJOKS. I T A H »**>1 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - 1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That Defendant is denied any claim, past, present 
or future, for an award of any part of Plaintiff's current 
retirement benefits. 
2. That Defendant is awarded the right to any bene-
fits she may have by Federal law as the surviving former 
spouse of Plaintiff, a retired serviceman. Said benefits 
are those accruing upon his death. 
3. Defendant is awarded a judgment against the 
Plaintiff in the sum of $633.00 as and for her travel 
expenses pursuant to the award in the Decree of Divorce. 
4. Defendant is denied any claim to personal property 
in the way of furniture or furnishings from Plaintiff. 
5. Each party shall bear his own attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in this action. 
DATED this day of April, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - 2 
N O T I C E 
HETTIK J MARSH 
A T T O R N K \ AT I . A * 
*4-»7 KIKMkL AN K M K 
OODK> L T A H »**Ol 
TO: SCOTT W. HOLT, ATTORNFY FOR DEFENDANT: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, 
attorney for Plaintiff, will submit the above and foregoing 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE to the Judge of the 
above-entitled Court for his signature, upon the expiration 
of five (5) days from the date this Notice is mailed to you, 
and after allowing three (3) days for mailing, unless 
written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to 
Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts of 
the State of Utah." Kindly govern yourself accordingly, 
DATED this /^^day of April, 1986. 
JH 
>r Plaintiff 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
>n this ^/f^L day of April, 1986, I HEREBY CERTIFY that or 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by placing same in the U.S. 
Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the following: 
Scott W. Holt 
Attorney for Defendant 
44 North Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 
SECRETARY 7 ^/ 
J MARSH 
f\ AT t-AW 
Kb AN E M K 
T A H *+4<M 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - 4 
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Uniformed TITLE X—FORMER SPOUSES' PROTECTION 
Services Former 
P r S ' o n A c t . SHORT TITLE 
10 USC 1401 SEC. 1001. This title may be cited as the "Uniformed Services 
note
' Former Spouses' Protection Act". 
PAYMENT OF RETIRED AND RETAINER PAY 
SEC. 1002. (a) Chapter 71 of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section: 
10 USC 1408. "§1408. Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with 
court orders 
Definitions. "(a) In this section: 
"(1) 'Court* means— 
"(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of any State, the 
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Northern 
Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands; 
"(B) any court of the United States (as defined in section 
451 of title 28) having competent jurisdiction; and 
"(C) any court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign 
-country with which the United States has an agreement 
requiring the United States to honor any court order of 
such country. 
"(2) 'Court order' means a final decree of divorce, dissolution, 
annulment, or legal separation issued by a court, or a court 
ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to 
such a decree (including a final decree modifying the terms of a 
previously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or 
legal separation, or a court ordered, ratified, or approved prop-
erty settlement incident to such previously issued decree), 
which— 
"(A) is issued in accordance with the laws of the jurisdic-
tion of that court; 
"(B) provides for— 
"(i) payment of child support (as defined in section 
462(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 6620))))"; 
"(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in section 462(c) 
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 662(c)))"; or 
"(iii) division of property (including a division of 
community property); and 
"(© specifically provides for the payment of an amount, 
expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired 
or retainer pay, from the disposable retired or retainer pay 
of a member to the spouse or former spouse of that member, 
"(3) 'Final decree* means a decree from which no appeal may 
be taken or from which no appeal has been taken within the 
time allowed for taking such appeals under the laws applicable 
to such appeals, or a decree from which timely appeal has beer 
taken and such appeal has been finally decided under the laws 
applicable to such appeals. 
(4) 'Disposable retired or retainer pay' means the tota 
monthly retired or retainer pay to which a member is entitlec 
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(other than the retired pav of a member retired for disability 
under chapter 61 of this title) less amounts which— 10 USC 1201 ct 
"(A) are owed by that member to the United States; "*• 
"(B) are required by law to be and are deducted from the 
retired or retainer pay of such member, including fines and 
forfeitures ordered by courts-martial, Federal employment 
taxes, and amounts waived in order to receive compensa-
tion under title 5 or title 38; f,«5?ni01: M 
"(C) are properly withheld for Federal, State, or local U S C 1 0 L 
income tax purposes, if the withholding of such amounts is 
authorized or required by law and to the extent such 
amounts withheld are not greater than would be authorized 
if such member claimed all dependents to which he was 
entitled; 
"(D) are withheld under section 34Q2(i) pf the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 3402(i)) if such member 
presents evidence of a tax obligation which supports such 
withholding; 
"(E) are deducted as Government life insurance premi-
ums (not including amounts deducted for supplemental 
coverage); or 
"(F) are deducted because of an election under chapter 73 
of this title to provide an annuity to a spouse or former 10 USC 1431 et 
spouse to whorp payment of a portion of such member's teq 
retired or retainer pay is being made pursuant to a court 
order under this section. 
"(5) 'Member' includes a former member. 
"(6) 'Spouse or former spouse' means the husband or wife, or 
former husband or wife, respectively, of a member who, on or 
before the date of a court order, was married to that member. 
"(b) For the purposes of this section— 
"(1) service of a court order is effective if— 
"(A) an appropriate. agent of the Secretary concerned 
designated for receipt of service of court orders under regu-
lations prescribed pursuant to subsection (h) or, if no agent 
has been so designated, the Secretary concerned, is person-
ally served or
 fis served by certified or registered mail, 
return receipt requested; 
"(B) the court order is regular on its face; 
"(C) the court order or other documents served with the 
court order identify the member concerned and include the 
social security number of such member; and 
"(D) the court order or other documents served with Ihe 
court order certify that the rights of the member under the 
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S,C. App. 
501 et seq.) were observed; and 
"(2) a court order is regular on its face if the order—I 
"(A) is issued by a court of competent jurisdictioiji; 
"(B) is legal in form; and 
"(C) includes nothing on its face that provides reasonable 
notice that it is issued without authority of law. 
"(cXD Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat 
lisposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay 
>eriods beginning after June 25, 19ol, either as prooerty solely of 
he member or as property of the member and his spouse in 
iccordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court 
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"(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section does 
not create any right, title, or interest which can be sold, assigned, 
transferred, or otherwise disposed of (including by inheritance) by a 
spouse or former spouse. 
"(3) This section does not authorize any court to order a member 
to apply for retirement or retire at a particular time in order to 
effectuate any payment under this section. 
"(4) A court may not treat the disposable retired or retainer pay of 
a member in the manner described in paragraph (1) unless the court 
has jurisdiction over the member by reason of (A) his residence, 
other than because of military assignment, in the territorial juris-
diction of the court, (B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of 
the court, or (C) his consent to the jurisdiction of the court 
"(dXD After effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court 
order with respect to the payment of apportion of the retired or 
retainer pay of a member to the spouse or a former spouse of the 
member, the Secretary shall, subject to the limitations of this 
section, make payments to the spouse or former spouse in the 
amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of the member 
specifically provided for in the court order. In the case of a member 
entitled to receive retired or retainer pay on the date of the effective 
service of the court order, such payments shall begin not later than 
90 days after the date of effective service. In the case of a member 
not entitled to receive retired or retainer pay on the date of the 
effective service of the court order, such payments shall begin not 
later than 90 days after the date on which the member first becomes 
entitled to receive retired or retainer pay. 
"(2) If the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are to be 
made under this section was not married to the member for a period 
of 10 years or more during which the member performed at least 
10 years of service creditable in determining the member's eligibil-
ity for retired or retainer pay, payments may not be made under 
this section to the extent that they include an amount resulting 
from the treatment by the court under subsection (c) of disposable 
retired or retainer pay of the member as property of the member or 
property of the member and his spouse. 
"(3) Payments under this section shall not be made more fre-
quently than once each month, and the Secretary concerned shall 
not be required to vary normal pay and disbursement cycles for 
retired or retainer pay in order to comply with a court order. 
"(4) Payments from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a 
member pursuant to this section shall terminate in accordance with 
the terms of the applicable court order, but not later than the date 
of the death of the member or the date of the death of the spouse or 
former spouse to whom payments are being made, whichever occurs 
first. ^ 
"(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) provides for a 
division of property (including a division of community property) in 
addition to an amount of disposable retired or retainer pay, the 
Secretary concerned shall, subject to the limitations of this section, 
pay to the spouse or former spouse of the member, from the dispos-
able retired or retainer pay of the member, any part of the amount 
payable to the spouse or former spouse under the division of prop-
erty upon effective service of a final court order of garnishment of 
such amount from such retired or retainer pay. 
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"(eXD The total amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay 
of a member payable under subsection (d) may not exceed 50 percent 
of such disoosable retired or retainer pay. 
"(2) In tne event of effective service of more than one court order 
which provide for payment to a spouse and one or more former 
spouses or to more than one former spouse from the disposable 
retired or retainer pay of a member, such pay shall be used to satisfy 
(subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) such court orders on a 
first-come, first-served basis. Such court orders shall be satisfied 
(subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) out of that amount of 
disposable retired or retainer pay which remains ailer the satisfac-
tion of all court orders which have been previously served. 
"(3XA) In the event of effective service of conflicting court orders 
under this section which assert to direct that different amounts be 
paid during a month to the same spouse or former spouse from the 
disposable retired or retainer pay of the same member, the Secre-
tary concerned shall— 
"(i) pay to that spouse the least amount of disposable retired 
or retainer pay directed to be paid during that month by any 
such conflicting court order, but not more than the amount of 
disposable retired or retainer pay which remains available for 
payment of such court orders based on when such court orders 
were effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and 
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4>, 
"(ii) retain an amount of disposable retired or retainer pay 
that is equal to the lesser of— 
"(I) the difference between the largest amount of retired 
or retainer pay required by any conflicting court order to be 
paid to the spouse or former spouse and the amount pay-
able to the spouse or former spouse under clause (i); and 
"(II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay 
which remains available for payment of any conflicting 
court order based on when such court order was effectively 
served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and subpara-
graph (B) of paragraph (4); and 
"(in) pay to that member the amount which is equal to the 
amount of that member's disposable retired or retainer pay (less 
any amount paid during such month pursuant to legal process 
served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
659) and any amount paid during such month pursuant to court 
orders effectively served under this section, other than such 
conflicting court orders) minus— 
"(I) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay paid 
under clause (i); and 
"(II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay 
retained under clause (ii). 
"(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the amount retained 
under clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) until such time as that Secrer 
tary is provided with a court order which has been certified by the 
member and the spouse or former spouse to be valid and applicable 
to the retained amount Upon being provided with such an order, 
the Secretary shall pay the retained amount in accordance with the 
order. 
"(4XA) In the event of effective service of a court order under this 
section and the service of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the 
Social Security Act (42 UJS.C. 659), both of which provide for pay-
ments during a month from the retired or retainer pay of the same 
• t - m (27f> 0 - 1 2 - 3 
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member, such court orders and legal process shall be satisfied on a 
first-come, first^served basis. Such court orders and legal process 
shall be satisfied out of moneys which are subject to such ordera and 
legal process and which remain available in accordance with the 
limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of this paragraph 
during such month after the satisfaction of all court orders or legal 
process which have been previously served. 
"(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount 
of the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member payable by the 
Secretary concerned under all court orders pursuant to this section 
and all legal processes pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 659) with respect to a member may hot exceed 65 
percent of the disposable retired or retainer j>ay payable to such 
member. l 
"(5) A court order which itself or because of previously served 
court orders provides for the payment of an amount of disposable 
retired or retainer pay which exceeds the amount of such pay 
available for payment because of the limit set forth in paragraph (1), 
or which, because of previously served court orders or legal process 
previously served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 659), provides for payment of an amount of disposable retired 
or retainer pay that exceeds the maximum amount permitted under 
paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4), shall not be 
considered to be irregular on its face solely for that reason. How-
ever, such order shall be considered to be fully satisfied for purposes 
of this section by the payment to the spouse or former spouse of the 
maximum amount of disposable retired or retainer pay permitted 
under paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). 
"(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member 
of liability for the payment of alimony, child support, or other 
payments required by a court order on the grounds that payments 
made out of disposable retired or retainer pay under this section 
have been made in the maximum amount permitted under para-
graph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). Any such unsatisfied 
obligation of a member may be enforced by any means available 
under law other than the means provided under this section in any 
case in which the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) 
has been paid and under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 659) in any case in which the maximum amount permitted 
under subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4) has been paid. 
"(fXD The United States and any officer or employee of the United 
States shall not be liable with respect to any payment made from 
retired or retainer pay to any member, spouse, or former spouse 
pursuant to a court order that is regular on its face if such payment 
is made in accordance with this section and the regulations pre-
scribed pursuant to subsection (h). 
"(2) An officer or employee of the United States who, under 
regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (h), has the duty to 
respond to interrogatories shall not be subject under any law to any 
disciplinary action or civil or criminal liability or penalty for, or 
because of, any disclosure of information made by him in carrying 
out any of his duties which directly or indirectly pertain to answer-
ing such interrogatories. 
(g) A person receiving effective service of a court order under this 
section shall, as soon as possible, but not later than 30 days after 
the date on which effective service is made, send a written notice of 
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such court order (together with a copy of such order) to the member 
a/Tected by the court order at his last known address. 
"(h) The Secretaries concerned shall prescribe uniform regula- Regulation*, 
tions for the administration of this section.". 
(b) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is 
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item: 
"1408. Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with court orders.**. 
ANNUITIES UNDER THE SURVIVOR BENEFIT PLAN 
SEC 1003. (a) Section 1447 of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new para-
graphs: 
"(6) 'Former spouse' means the surviving former husband or Definitions. 
wife of a person who is eligible to participate in the Plan. 
"(7) 'Court' has the meaning given that term by section 
1408(aXl) of this title *** p 730. 
"(8) 'Court order' means a court's final decree of divorce, 
dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, or a court ordered, 
ratified^ or approved property settlement incident to such a 
decree (including a final decree modifying the terms of a previ-
ously issued decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal 
separation, or of a court ordered, ratified, or approved property 
settlement agreement incident to such previously issued 
decree). 
"(9) 'Final decree* means a decree from which no appeal may 
be taken or frorp which no appeal has been taken within the 
time allowed for the taking of such appeals under the laws 
applicable to such appeals, or a decree from which timely 
appeal has been taken and such appeal has been finally decided 
under the laws applicable to such appeals. 
"(10) 'Regular on its face', when used in connection with a 
court order, means a court order that meet$ the conditions 
prescribed in section 1408(bX2) of this title.". | ****. P ?30. 
(bXl) Section 1448(a) of such title is amended— 1 10 u s c 1448 
(A) in paragraph (3XA) by inserting "or elects to provide an 
annuity under subsection U>X2) of this section," after "for his 
spouse,"; and j 
(B) in paragraph (3XB) by inserting "or electa to provide an 
annuity under subsection 0>X2) of this section," after "for his 
spouse,". * * 
(2) Section 1448(b) of such title is amended to read as follows: 
"(bXl) A person who is not married and does not have a dependent 
child when he becomes eligible to participate in the Plan may elect 
to provide an annuity to a natural person with an.insurable interest 
in that person or to provide an annuity to a former spouse. 
"(2) A person who is married or has a dependent child may elect to 
provide an annuity to a former spouse instead of providing an 
annuity to a spouse or dependent child if the election is made in 
order to carry out the terms of a written agreement entered into 
voluntarily with the former spouse (without regard to whether such 
agreement is included in or approved by a court order). 
"(3) In the case of a person electing to provide an annuity under 
paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection by virtue of eligibility under 
subsection (aXIXB), the election shall include a designation under 
subsection (e). 
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"(4) Any person who elects under paragraph (1) or (2) to provide an 
annuity to a former spouse shall, at the time of making such 
election, provide the Secretary concerned with a written statement, 
in a form to be prescribed by that Secretary, signed by such person 
and the former spouse setting forth whether the election is being 
made pursuant to a voluntary written agreement previously entered 
into by such person as a part of or incident to a proceeding of 
divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, and if so, 
whether such voluntary written agreement has been incorporated in 
or ratified or approved by a court order/'. 
10 USC 1450. (c) Section 1450(aX4) of such title is amended— 
(1) by inserting "former spouse or other" before "natural 
person"; and 
(2) by striking out "if there is no eligible beneficiary under 
clause (1) or clause (2)" and inserting in lieu thereof "unless the 
election to provide an annuity to the former spouse or other 
natural person has been changed as provided in subsection (0". 
(d) Section 1450(f) of such title is amended to read as follows* 
"(fXD A person who elects to provide an annuity to a person 
Ante, p. 735. designated by him under section 1448(b) of this title may, subject to 
paragraph (2) of this subsection, change that election and provide an 
annuity to his spouse or dependent child. The Secretary concerned 
shall notify the former spouse or other natural person previously 
designated under section 1448(b) of this title of any change of 
election under the first sentence of this paragraph. Any such change 
of election is subject to the same rules with respect to execution, 
revocation, and effectiveness as are set forth in section 1448(aX5) of 
this title. 
"(2) A person who, incident to a proceeding of divorce, dissolution, 
annulment, or legal separation, enters into a voluntary written 
agreement to elect under section 1448(b) of this title to provide an 
annuity to a former spouse and who makes an election pursuant to 
such agreement may not change such election under paragraph (1) 
unless— 
"(A) in a case in which such agreement has been incorporated 
in or ratified or approved by a court order, the person— 
"(i) furnishes to the Secretary concerned a certified cop> 
of a court order which is regular on its face and modifies 
the provisions of all previous court orders relating to the 
agreement to make such election so as to permit the persor 
to change the election; and 
W(ii) certifies to the Secretary concerned that the couri 
order is valid and in effect; or 
"(B) in a case in which such agreement has not been incorpo 
rated or ratified or approved by a court order, the person-
"(i) furnishes to the Secretary concerned a statement, ii 
such form as the Secretary concerned may prescribe, signe< 
by the former spouse and evidencing the former spouse* 
agreement to a change in the election under paragraph (1 
and 
"(ii) certifies to the Secretary concerned that the state 
ment is current and in effect. 
"(3) Nothing in this chapter authorizes any court to order an 
person to elect under section 1448(b) of this title to provide a 
annuity to a former spouse unless such person has voluntaril 
agreed in writing to make such election." 
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MEDICAL BENEFITS 
SEC. 1004. (a) Section 1072(2) of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended— 
(1) by striking out •'and" at the end of clause (D); 
(2) by striking out the period at the end of clause (E) and 
inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and "and"; and 
(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new clause: 
'(F) the unremarried former spouse of a member or 
former member who (i) on the date of the final decree of 
divorce, dissolution, or annulment, had been married to the 
member or former member for a period of at least 20 
years during which period the member or former member 
performed at least 20 years of service which is credit-
able in determining that member's or former member's 
eligibility for retired or retainer pay, or equivalent payr and (ii) does not have medical coverage under an employer-
sponsored health plan.". 
(b) Section 1076(b) of such title is amended by inserting at the end io USC 1076. 
thereof the following: "A dependent described in section 1072(2XF) of 
this title may be provided medical and dental care pursuant to 
clause (2) without regard to subclause (B) of such clause. . 
(c) Section 1086(c) of such title is amended by inserting afler 10 u s c 1086 
clause (2) the following new clause: 
"(3) A dependent covered by section 1072(2XF) of this title." 10 u s c 1072 
COMMISSARY AND EXCHANGE PRIVILEGES 
SEC. 1005. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe 6uch regula- Re€u^ t ions . 
tions as may be necessary to provide that an unremarried former ^J1 14 
6pouse described in subparagraph (FXi) of section 1072(2) of title 10, 
United States Code (as added by section 1004), is entitled to commis-
sary and post exchange privileges to the same extent and on the 
same basis as the surviving spouse of a retired member of t[he 
uniformed services. 
EFFECTIVE DATES AND TRANSITION 
SEC. 1006. (a) The amendments made by this title shall take effect ™ USC 1408 
on the first day of the first month which begins more than one no te 
hundred and twenty days after the date of the enactment of this 
title. 
(b) Subsection (d) of section 1408 of title 10, United States Code, as 
added by section 1002(a), 6hall apply only with respect to payments AnU> P 730 
of retired or retainer pay for periods beginning on or after the 
effective date of this title, but without regard to the date of any 
court order. However, in the case of a court order that became final 
before June 26, 1981, pavments under such subsection may only be 
made in accordance with such order as in effect on such date and 
without regard to any subsequent modifications. 
(c) The amendments made by section 1003 of this title shall apply 
to persons who become eligible to participate in the Survivor Benefit 
Plan provided for in subchapter U of chapter 73 of title 10, United 
States Code, before, on, or after the effective date of such amend- 10 u s c 1447« 
merits. 
(d) The amendments made by section 1004 of this title and the 
provisions of section 1005 of this title shall apply in the case of any 
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former spouse of a member or former member of the uniformed 
services only if the final decree of divorce, dissolution, or annulment 
of the marriage of the former spouse and such member or former 
member is dated on or after the effective date of such amendments. 
Definition!. (e) For the purposes of this section— (1) the term "court order" has the same meaning as provided 
in section 1408(aX2) of title 10, United States Code (as added by 
Ante, p. 730. section 1002 of this title); 
(2) the term "former spouse" has the same meaning as pro-
vided in section 1408(aX6) of such title (as added by section 1002 
of this title); and 
(3) the term "uniformed services" has the same meaning as 
provided in section 1408(a)(7) of such title (as added by section 
1002 of this title). 
BENNETT v. BENNETT Utah 8 3 9 
Ctu it, Uuh, •*? P^d iStJ 
appealed. In a per curiam unpublished 
opinion, ttie Supreme Court affirmed, and 
husband filed petition for rehearing. The 
Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that fact 
that testimony and findings in case estab-
lished that that portion of husband's retire-
ment fund contributed by United States 
Government had no present value, and may 
not have a|ny value in future, meant that it 
was error for trial court to consider such 
matter as 4>ne of assets of parties, thereby 
using it as one of significant predicates in 
court's determination of property division 
between parties provided for in decree. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Crocket^., C. J., dissented and filed opin-
ion in whichj Stewart, J., concurred. 
Charles N. BENNETT, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Donna Mae BENNETT, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 16268. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 20, 1980. 
\n divorce action, ihe Second Y>\a\ric\ 
Court, Davis County, Maurice J. Harding, 
J., entered judgment from which husband 
8. Center Creek Water and Irrigation Co. v. 
Lindsay, 21 Utah 192. 60 P. 559 (1900). See 
ai*o Houaer v. Smith, 19 Utah 150, 56 P. 683 
(1899). 
*• Jacobaen v. Jacobaen, Utah. 557 P.2d 156 
(1976). 
Divorce <*=>253<3) 
In divorce action, fact that testimony 
and findings in case established that Vnat 
portion of husband's retirement fund con-
tributed by Ujnited States Government had 
no present vajue, and may not have any 
value in future, meant that it was error for 
trial court to consider such matter as one of 
assets of parties, thereby using it as one of 
significant predicates in court's determina-
tion of property division between parties 
provided for in decree. U.C.A.1953, 30-3--5. 
Pete N. Viands, Ogden, for plaintiff and 
appellant 
J. Val Roberts, Centerville, for defendant 
and respondent 
WILKINS, Justice: 
A petition for rehearing in this divorce 
action was granted by this Court after its 
per txflwn ropttty>ato& t>pvnten v**s ftted ot* 
October 19, 1979, which affirmed the action 
of the District Court of Davis County. 
10. State ex ret Bhrk v. Oklahoma Chy, Okl., 
522 P.2d 612 (1973). See alio Pacific Metals 
Co. v. Tracy-Coihna Bank A Truat Co., 21 Utah 
2d 400, 446 PM 303 (1968). 
11. U.C.A. 1953. 57-41-13. 
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Plaintiff and defendant were married on 
May 31, 1947, and have four children as 
issue of this marriage, two of whom are 
emancipated. The two minor children re-
side with defendant, to whom care, custody, 
and control were awarded on November 29, 
1978, by the District Court 
The only issue we shall address here is 
whether the District Court erred in con-
sidering as an asset of this marriage the 
share of plaintiffs retirement fund contrib-
uted by the United States government. 
The plaintiff is—and has been—employed 
at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. 
The Court, in its award to the defendant 
of the real property of the parties, the 
equity of which was $38,000, imposed a lien 
of $5,000 on that property in favor of the 
plaintiff, making the lien payable upon the 
occurrence of one of four conditions, which 
are not pertinent to this appeal. 
The retirement officer in the Civilian 
Personnel Office at Hill Air Force Base, a 
Margaret S. Woods, testified that as of the 
time of this divorce hearing the present 
value of plaintiffs retirement fund was 
$15,681.95, the amount of his total contribu-
tion. She further stated that the U. S. 
government had contributed the same 
amount to his retirement fund; viz., $15,-
681.95, and that plaintiff could withdraw 
his contribution any time prior to thirty-one 
days before the eligibility date for his 
retirement on May 7, 1984. The retirement 
officer further testified, "[t]he amount of 
money that he (plaintiff) has in the retire-
ment fund does not have any bearing on 
what he would get under retirement month-
ly annuity. The only value of what he has 
in the retirement fund is for income tax 
purposes or death benefit purposes.'* She 
did not elaborate on this last, somewhat 
cryptic, sentence. But, from her uncontra-
dicted testimony, we believe no reasonable 
interpretation can be placed on it other 
than one that concludes no present value 
can be assigned to that portion of plaintiffs 
retirement fund contributed by the U. S. 
1. This section reads: 
•*When a decree of divorce is made, the court 
may make such orders in relation to the chil-
govemment And the Court in its findings 
found no present value on this portion. 
Significantly, the Court, in determining 
what an equitable amount of this lien 
should be, frankly acknowledged that it 
considered the amount of the government's 
contribution to plaintiffs retirement fund. 
The following dialogue occurred between 
the Court and plaintiffs counsel: 
Mr. Vlahos: Your Honor, if I understand 
your Honor'8 position in reference to 
this $5,000.00 lien, it is based on some 
$15,000.00 that the government has 
that he can't touch, has no control over, 
has never seen, rather than taking 
what the parties can have right now? 
The Court: Yes. That's taken into con-
sideration. I want that understood, so 
that in case you do want to appeal, and 
have that matter raised you can do so. 
In Englcrt v. Englert, Utah, 576 ?2A 
1274, 1276 (1978), this Court in interpreting 
Sec. 30 3 51 stated: 
It is our opinion that the correct view 
under our law is that this encompasses all 
of the assets of every nature possessed by 
the parties, whenever obtained and from-
whatever source derived; and that this 
includes any such pension fund or insur-
ance. These should be given due consid-
eration along with all other assets, in-
come and the earnings and the potential 
earning capacity of the parties, in deter*! 
mining what is the most practical, just 
and equitable way to serve the beat inter-
ests and welfare of the parties and their 
children. (Emphasis added). 
Because the testimony and findingi ip 
this case clearly establish that that portioft 
of the plaintiffs retirement fund contribo$| 
ed by the U. S. government has no pieteffi 
value—and may not have any value in thS 
future—we hold that it was error for tx 
District Court to consider this matter as OH 
of the assets of the parties, thereby u s i n o | 
as one of the significant predicate* in tfH 
Court's determination of property divfefefl 
dren. property and parties, and the mtftM 
nance of the parties and children, as may JH 
equitable • • • •• 
between the parties provided for in the 
decree. 
Other matters raised by plaintiff are 
deemed to be without merit 
Reversed a^d remanded for proceedings 
concerning the matter of property distribu-
tion between the parties consistent with 
this opinion. Affirmed in all other respects. 
No costs or attorney's fees are awarded. 
MAUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (dissenting): 
I would adhere to our prior decision. I 
am in hearty agreement with the quote 
from the Englert case that the court should 
consider "all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived and that 
this includes such pension fund or insur-
ance"; and this should include anything 
that is realistic and substantial, even in 
expectancy. To demonstrate the complete 
illogic of plaintiff's counsel's argument that 
the court should not consider the pension 
fund because the plaintiff has never seen it 
or had possession or control over it: suppose 
it had been determined in a probate pro-
ceeding that the plaintiff was to receive a 
substantial inheritance from a relative's es-
tate, but it was not to be paid him until 
completion of the probate. Would it be 
argued that because he had never seen the 
money, nor had possession or control over it, 
the court could not consider it as a part of 
the total circumstances. 
The trial judge was ineluctably correct in 
stating that he had considered all the cir-
cumstances, including the possibility that 
the plaintiff would receive the pension re-
ferred to. 
There is a matter far more important and 
controlling than the foregoing, quite re-
gardless of the statement the trial judge 
made, which has provided a basis for fur-
ther controversy, and for this appeal. As 
indicated in our original opinion, when this 
Court surveys the circumstances of these 
parties, as it may do in such cases, it is my 
judgment that the decree does no such ineq-
uity or injustice as to warrant this Courts 
interference Xhere^\lh. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the views ex-
pressed in the opinion of CROCKETT, C. J. 
Sir KCYftUMMRSrSTCM ™> 
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whether right to benefit or asset has ac-
Marvin L. WOODWARD, Plaintiff, crued in whole or in part during marriage, 
Appellant and Cross-Respondent, and, to extent that right has so accrued, it 
is subject to equitable distribution. 
4. Divorce <*=>252.3(4) 
In divorce proceeding, trial court prop-
erly awarded wife one-half share in that 
portion of husband's government retire-
ment benefits to which rights accrued dur-
ing marriage, notwithstanding that hus-
band was not entitled to any such benefits 
until and unless he worked additional 15 
years at government job. 
5. Divorce *=»252.3(4) 
Where husband's right to retirement 
benefits was contingent upon his working 
an additional 15 years, trial court properly 
awarded wife share in such benefits in form 
of deferred distribution based upon fixed 
percentage. 
v. 
Mildred L WOODWARD, Defendant, 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
No, 18089. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 4, 1982. 
The First District Court, Box Elder 
County, VeNoy Christoffersen, J., granted 
divorce with property division, and husband 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., 
held that: (1) trial court properly awarded 
wife share in that portion of husband's 
retirement benefits to which rights accrued 
during marriage, notwithstanding that hus-
band was not entitled to such benefits until 
he worked additional 15 years, and (2) 
award of such benefits was properly made 
in form of deferred distribution based upon 
fixed percentage. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
1. Divorce <*=» 252.3(4) 
Concept of "vesting" of retirement and 
pension rights is inappropriate basis for de-
termining what property should be subject 
to equitable division in divorce proceeding. 
2. Divorce <*=» 252.3(1, 4) 
In fashioning equitable property divi-
sion in divorce proceeding, court may take 
into consideration all pertinent circumstanc-
es, encompassing all assets of every nature 
possessed by parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived, and in-
cluding retirement and pension rights; 
overruling Bennett v. Bennett, 607 P.2d 
839. 
3. Divorce *=» 252^(1) 
Whether resource is subject to distribu-
tion in divorce proceeding does not turn on 
whether spouse can presently use or control 
lt> or on whether resource can be given 
present dollar value; essential criterion is 
S56P2d—II 
Brian R. Florence, Ogden, for plaintiff, 
appellant and cross-respondent. 
Ben H-. Had field, Brigham City, for de-
fendant, res|x>ndent and cross-apjiellant. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
The plaintiff husband appeals from that 
portion of the trial court's decree of divorce 
which awanied to the defendant wife a 
portion of his retirement benefits. The 
husliand argues that the court erred in con-
sidering, as a marital asset, that portion of 
his j>ension which would be contributed by 
the government at some future date. 
The husband has worked as a civilian 
employee at Hill Air Force Base for fifteen 
years. Under his government pension plan, 
he has contributed $17,500 to the pension 
fund during that time. If he were to leave 
his job now, he would receive only the 
amount of his contributions. In order to 
receive maximum benefits from the plan, 
the husband would have to participate in it 
for a total of 80 years. At that time, the 
government would match the amount of his 
contributions and the husband could elect to 
receive the benefits as an annuity or as a 
lump sum. In its Findings of Fact, the trial 
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court stated that, because one-half of the 
30-year period occurred during the mar-
riage and because the wife is entitled to 
one-half o f the amount accrued during that 
time, the v:fe was therefore "granted an 
equity interest of one-fourth of all proceeds 
which the [husband] receives on his retire-
ment account, to be paid to [the wife] . . . 
as [the husband] receives the proceeds." 
The husband concedes that the wife is enti-
tled to one-half of the sum he has contribut-
ed during the fifteen years of their mar-
riage. However, he claims that she has no 
right or interest in the amount to be con-
tributed by the government at the time of 
his retirement because that amount is con-
tingent upon his continued government em-
ployment 
[1,2] The only authority cited by the 
husband for his position is Bennett v. Ben-
nett, Utah, 607 P.2d 839 (1980). In that 
case, this Court reversed a trial court's divi-
sion of the husband's retirement benefits 
because the government's future contribu-
tion to the retirement fund was found to 
have "no present value." Id, at 840. How-
ever, in Dogu v. Dogu, Utah, 652 P.2d 1308 
(1982), we commented that "that holding 
reflected a failure of proof." Id. The wife 
urges the adoption of the position taken by 
the California Supreme Court in In re Mar-
riage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 
126 Cal.Rptr. 633 (1976). There the court 
held that "[p]ension rights, whether or not 
vested, represent a property interest; to 
the extent that such rights derive from 
employment during coverture, they com-
prise a community asset subject to division 
in a dissolution proceeding." Id. at 562-63, 
126 Cal.Rptr. at 634-35. This case over-
ruled an earlier California case of long-
standing which had distinguished pension 
rights on the basis of whether the rights 
had vested. In the context of Utah law, we 
find it unnecessary to consider whether or 
1. In Stern v. Stern. 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 
(1975), the court commented that "the concept 
of vesting should probably find no significant 
place in the developing law of equitable distri-
bution." Id at 348,331 AJZ6 at 262. The court 
refers briefly to the origins of the vested inter-
est as it was associated with the concept of 
not the pension rights are "vested or noifc 
vested" ! In Englert v. Englert, Uta^vfif 
P.2d 1274 (1978), we emphasized the eqs 
ble nature of proceedings dealing with ^ 
family, pointing out that the court 
take into consideration all of the pertineittS 
circumstances. These circumstances etii 
compass "all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived; and 
that this includes any such pension fund dt 
insurance." Id. at 1276. To the extent thai 
Bennett v. Bennett, supra, may limit tijj 
ability of the court to consider all of thai 
parties* assets and circumstances, including 
retirement and pension rights, it is expreafe 
ly overruled. ^ 
[3] In the instant case, the husband 
gues that because he cannot now ben 
from the government's promised contrib 
tions to his pension at the time of retrJ 
ment, the wife should not receive any 
tion of the benefits which are based on 
government's participation. This argur 
fails to recognize that pension or retiren 
benefits are a form of deferred compensa* 
tion by the employer. If the rights to thoag 
benefits are acquired during the marriage 
then the court must at least consider thoM 
benefits in making an equitable distribution 
of thej marital assets. " 'The right to ret 
ceive monies in the future is unquestionably 
. . . an economic resource' subject to equita& 
ble distribution based upon proper compute 
tion of its present dollar value." Kikkert v\ 
Kikkert, 177 N.J.Super. 471, 475, 427 AM 
76, 78 (|981) (emphasis and omission in orig? 
inal) (quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 NJi 
464, 46^, 375 A.2d 659, 662 (1977)), a f f d , ^ 
N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981). Whether tfa|g 
resource is subject to distribution does'JTtfJj 
turn on whether the spouse can prese t^ 
use or control it, or-on whether the reaooo^ 
can be given a present dollar value. - J*" 
essential criterion is whether a right to.1 
seisin and also to its use in connection. 
"vested rights'* in discussions of i 
guaranties. We agree that this 
"vesting** is an inappropriate basis for 
mining what property should be subject t 
uitable division in a divorce proceeding. - >> 
WOODWARD v 
CUea*,Uuh, 
efit or asset has accrued in whole or in 
„ during the marriage. To the extent 
t the right has so accrued it is subject to 
itabie distribution. 
i] In the instant case, the husband 
st work for another fifteen years to 
Llify f^ r the maximum benefits under 
pension plan. He will not qualify in the 
>nty-ninth year or in the next to the last 
nth. Because he must work for a total 
thirty years, his pension benefits, includ-
r any contribution by the government, 
» as dependent on the first fifteen years 
the last fifteen. Thus, the wife is enti-
d to share in that portion of the benefits 
which the rights accrued during the mar-
ige. We hold that the trial court did not 
r in making equitable distribution of the 
isband's retirement benefits. 
[5] We also hold that the method used 
I distribute the retirement benefits was a 
•oper exercise of the court's discretion. 
^ agree with the discussion in Kikkert, 
lpra, where it was stated: 
Long-term and deferred sharing of finan-
cial interests are obviously too susceptible 
to continued strife and hostility, circum-
stances which our courts traditionally 
strive to avoid to the greatest extent 
possible. This goal may be best accom-
plished, if a present value of the pension 
plan is ascertainable, by fixing the other 
spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for all 
appropriate considerations, including the 
length of time the pensioner must survive 
to enjoy its benefits, to be satisfied out of 
other assets leaving all pension benefits 
to the employee himself. 
On the other hand, where other assets 
for equitable distribution are inadequate 
or lacking altogether, or where no 
present value can be established and the 
parties are unable to reach agreement, 
resort must be had to a form of deferred 
distribution based upon fixed percent-
ages. 
Id. at 478, 427 A.2d at 79-80. The facts in 
the present case present just such a circum-
stance: other assets available for equitable 
distribution are inadequate, and a present 
value of retirement benefits would be diffi-
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cult if not impossible to ascertain because 
the value of the benefits is contingent on 
the husband's decision to remain working 
for the government. In such a case, "the 
trial court could use a method widely em-
ployed in other states, whereby the trial 
court determines what percentage of the 
marital property each spouse is to receive, 
and then divides payments from the pension 
plan accordingly." Selchert v. Selchert, 90 
Wis^d 1, 10, 280 N.W.2d 293, 298 (1979). 
The Wisconsin court continued: 
Under this approach it is unnecessary to 
make any determination as to the value 
of the pension fund When the bene-
ficiary spouse then opts to receive pay-
ments under the pension plan, the non-
covered spouse would be entitled to her 
established percentage of those pay-
ments. . . . Any risk associated with the 
fund . . . would be by this method appor-
tioned equally between the parties. This 
method may [sic] particularly appropriate 
where the present value of a pension 
fund is very difficult or impossible to 
assess. 
Id. at 10-12, 280 N.W.2d at 298 (footnotes 
omitted). 
The trial court awarded one-half of the 
marital property to each of the parties in 
the instant case. It is clear that the court 
intended the wife to receive one-half of the 
retirement benefits which had accrued dur-
ing the fifteen-year marriage. However, in 
its order, the court specified that the wife 
receive one-fourth of the proceeds of the 
retirement plan as they are received by the 
husband. This portion, one-fourth, awards 
to the wife one-half of the benefits accrued 
during the marriage only if the husband 
works for the full thirty years. The order 
should be modified to provide for the wife 
to receive one-half of the benefits accrued 
during the marriage, regardless of the 
length of time the husband continues in the 
same employment Whenever the husband 
chooses to terminate his government em-
ployment, the marital property subject to 
distribution is a portion of the retirement 
benefits represented by the number of 
years of the marriage divided by the num-
ber of years of the husband's employment 
The wife is entitled to one-half of that 
portion pursuant to the award of the trial 
judge in this case, which our modification is 
intended to sustain. 
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in 
part and remand to the trial court so that 
the order may be amended to conform with 
this opinion. No costs or fees are awarded. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, OAKS and 
HOWE, JJ„ concur. 
